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Abstract 
The question of how psychiatric classifications are made up and to what they refer has attracted the attention of 
philosophers in recent years. In this paper, I review the claims of authors who discuss psychiatric classification 
in terms referring both to the philosophical tradition of natural kinds and to the sociological tradition of social 
constructionism—especially those of Ian Hacking and his critics. I examine both the ontological and the social 
aspects of what it means for something to be a mental disorder, and how the ontological status of these disorders 
hinges on social causation. Finally, I conclude by suggesting a way in which the biological and the social may 
be reconciled in an integrative model of variation in psychiatric disorder. 
 
 
Introduction   
A clear definition of mental disorder is of both conceptual and practical importance. On the 
one hand, precision will better ensure that we are talking about the same thing when we use 
the concept of mental disorder. On the other hand, a rigorous definition will help 
diagnosticians, particularly where it is unclear whether a condition is pathological or not.  
 
Consider homosexuality. The first edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM-I (APA, 1952) classified 
homosexuality as a sociopathic personality disturbance. Despite controversy, justification for 
its maintenance in the DSM-II (APA, 1968) was found in a large-scale psychoanalytic study 
of homosexuality, performed over ten years, which concluded that homosexuality was a 
pathological fear of the opposite sex caused by traumatic parent–child relationships. This 
pathologizing of homosexuality endured until a diagnosis of sexual orientation disturbance 
was introduced in the seventh printing of the DSM-II (APA, 1974) to classify the experience 
of significant discontent with the biological sex one was born with, a condition presently 
referred to as gender identity disorder. The publication of the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) saw 
the disappearance of sexual orientation disturbance, and also of ego-dystonic sexual 
orientation, the latter of which was meant to classify the condition wherein one’s sexual 
orientation is at odds with one’s idealized self-image.  
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The empty space left by the abandonment of ego-dystonic sexual orientation was filled with a 
residual category, sexual disorder not otherwise specified. As Nelson Goodman (1972) once 
wrote, the wastebasket seems to have been made an integral part of the filing system. If 
someone presents symptoms that justify a diagnosis of sexual disorder which, in turn, fails to 
meet the criteria for any of the sexual disorders that have been so far classified, that person is 
diagnosed as presenting a sexual disorder not otherwise specified. This is understandable, 
since most psychiatrists working today diagnose disorders looking for symptoms, not causal 
mechanisms (van Os et al., 2013). Furthermore, psychotherapy that is useful for patients 
presenting properly classified sexual disorders may be useful for patients presenting those of 
an unclassified kind. A not otherwise specified (NOS) diagnosis is the next best thing to 
precision. It is provisional and it is not meant to suggest that a NOS disorder shares the same 
status of a properly classified disorder. Nevertheless, the very presence of NOS diagnoses 
may raise suspicions as to the scientific legitimacy of psychiatric nosology (Zachar, 2012).  
 
Examples of prejudice cloaked in pseudoscience are regrettably common in the history of 
psychiatry. Indeed, they are common enough to intimate skepticism regarding the whole 
category of mental disorder, a denial embodied in the anti-psychiatry movement that still 
resonates today (Pickard, 2009). Thomas Szasz, one of its founders, wrote The Myth of 
Mental Illness in 1961, claiming that ‘mental disorder’ is a mere social construct 
manufactured by psychiatrists, and that the term can at best be used as a metaphor, given that 
a proper disorder must be an objectively demonstrable biological pathology. The anti-
psychiatry movement’s main theoretical tenet is that the definitions and criteria for many, if 
not most psychiatric diagnoses are vague and arbitrary, failing to meet basic scientific 
standards.  
 
Since the publication of Szasz’s book, however, biological psychiatry has seen many 
developments. Chemical treatment is widely successful for a large number of disorders such 
as seasonal affective disorder, clinical depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. This implies that we have acquired at least some 
understanding of mental disorders in terms of their chemical effects on the nervous system. 
Also, and perhaps as important for the scope of this investigation, a definition of mental 
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disorder was added to the introduction to the DSM-III (APA, 1980) and was modified for the 
first time since with the publication of the DSM-5: 
 
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant 
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or 
behaviour that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, 
or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental 
disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability 
in social, occupational, or other important activities. (APA, 2013, p. 
20, my emphasis) 
 
Unfortunately, there is a manifest vagueness in this definition, and hence in psychiatry’s 
current demarcation of mental disorders, that renders its utility very limited both to 
theoretical and clinical use. The ambiguity is best detected in the statements that behind the 
symptoms of a mental disorder there is a ‘psychological, biological, or developmental’ 
dysfunction, and that ‘mental disorders are usually associated with significant stress’, etc. 
There is no attempt to offer sufficient, let alone necessary, conditions for a condition to be a 
mental disorder. The vagueness in the DSM’s present definition betrays a deeper ambiguity 
about how psychiatry is conceived and practiced, signalling an old methodological divide 
between mutually suspicious ways of understanding mental disorder. We will see that the 
existence of this divide is not gratuitous and, most importantly, that there are reasons to think 
that it reflects something about the nature of mental disorders themselves, namely, that they 
are neither exclusively biological, nor exclusively social, phenomena. 
 
Models of Psychiatry 
The roots of psychopathology are the subject of the ideological traditions that usually divide 
psychiatrists into those who favor somatic treatment and those who favor psychotherapy. 
Each of these orientations stands on a theoretical assumption about the nature of mental 
disorder. Partisans of what has been called the biomedical model (Luhrmann, 2000) look to 
the brain and its dysfunctions, and employ neuroscience, biochemistry and pharmacology to 
resolve them. One of its champions, Samuel Guze, defines it as using in psychiatry the 
concepts and strategies that have evolved in general medicine (1992, p. 129). This approach 
has achieved scientific success through the increasing understanding of the biological bases 
of at least some psychiatric conditions and, as a consequence, it has enjoyed institutional 
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success through widespread prevalence in hospitals and research departments, while also 
being championed in theory (Murphy, 2009). 
 
The psychodynamic model, in turn, treats mental disorder not as the product of a diseased 
brain but as a malfunction of the person. Among its proponents, some deny the pathological 
status of mental disorder altogether, but most are primarily concerned with how 
psychopathology is conceived and treated. As critics of the biomedical model, proponents of 
the psychodynamic model see mental disorders as a response to social and cultural forces, at 
least to some degree. The successes of dynamic psychiatry lie in the contribution of 
psychotherapeutic sensibility. Without it, it has been argued, patients ‘do less well, are 
readmitted more quickly, diagnosed more inaccurately, and medicated more randomly’ 
(Luhrmann 2000, p. 262). 
 
While there have been efforts to synthesize these models and consequently achieve an ampler 
picture of the mind and its problems, it is arguable that the suppression of the psychodynamic 
by the biomedical model is possibly currently underway (Haslam, 2000).  This suppression, 
however, stands in direct contradiction to the ideas and practices of those who first 
championed the understanding of mental disorders from an organic basis. The 19th century 
Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler provides one of the best illustrations of this point 
(Ellenberger, 1970). While committed to the organic basis of mental disorders, Bleuler 
dedicated to establishing personal and social relationships with schizophrenic patients. ‘At a 
certain stage in his career, he lived with them night and day; visitors to the Burghölzli 
psychiatric hospital were amazed at the ways in which profoundly psychotic patients were 
able to live in consequence of Bleuler’s care. He believed in organic psychiatry, but practiced 
dynamic psychiatry’ (Hacking 1999, p. 118). 
 
The explanatory potential of each of these models can be more easily grasped by looking at 
specific cases. Schizophrenia, for example, is widely believed to lend itself to a 
neuroscientific explanation. Overactivity in dopamine systems, a discernible neurological 
dysfunction, is currently the prevalent hypothesis to explain it (Swerdlow and Koob, 1987). 
In keeping with this, Shitij Kapur (2003) has recently claimed that an increased release of 
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dopamine is responsible for contributing to the obsessive focus of subjects on their delusional 
thoughts. Another competing, although not contradictory, hypothesis based on a set of 
clinical, neuropathological and genetic findings, points to a hypofunction of glutamatergic 
signaling as its root cause (Lisman et al., 2008). There is little if any place for social 
causation in such models. Whatever pressures may affect the schizophrenic patient, they are 
not taken by most researchers to contribute to its explanation. 
 
In contrast, the psychodynamic or psychosocial approach fares better in the explanation of 
pathologies such as eating disorders, in the formation of which social forces are undeniably 
present. As severe as they can be, anorexia nervosa and bulimia are not necessarily 
accompanied by a single, discernible neurological condition (Hasan and Hasan, 2011). 
Nevertheless, even if we were to find out they were invariably a result of decreased serotonin 
activity, this would not necessarily rule out a possible role for social pressures in the 
causation of such neurological disturbances. 
 
Natural Kinds 
One particularly enlightening characterization of the biomedical model’s stance towards 
mental disorder is due to Horacio Fábrega, who observes that it postulates entities that show 
common features regardless of the person’s unique characteristics. These have specific 
causes, manifestations, and courses and ultimately entail natural objects and natural processes 
(1997, p. 133). In other words, biomedical psychiatry seems to conceive of mental disorders 
as natural kinds (Luhrmann, 2000, p. 44). 
 
The notion of a natural kind grows out of a long philosophical tradition that accepts that at 
least some categories are real, in the sense that they ‘carve nature at its joints’ and are 
therefore totally independent of human construction. Hence, a natural kind is a grouping or 
ordering of things that is natural, in opposition to artificial, which implies that these kinds are 
sharply bounded by the underlying defining properties, or essences, of their objects. Likely 
candidates for the title of natural kind are chemical elements, elementary physical particles 
and, arguably, biological species (Ereshefsky 2009). 
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Diseases are often included among examples of natural kinds. One of Hilary Putnam’s 
favored examples was multiple sclerosis: ‘There are objective laws obeyed by multiple 
sclerosis, by gold, by horses, by electricity; and what it is rational to include in these classes 
will depend on what those laws turn out to be’ (1983, p. 71). Thus his reason for alluding to 
multiple sclerosis stems from thinking that one of the characteristics that makes something a 
natural kind is its role in a systematic web of natural laws, and arguably multiple sclerosis 
fulfills such a role. The law-like regularity of natural kinds and their importance for scientific 
discourse has also been emphasized by Carl Gustav Hempel: 
 
Broadly speaking, the vocabulary of science has two basic 
functions: first, to permit an adequate description of the things 
and events that are the object of scientific investigation; second, 
to permit the establishment of general laws or theories by means 
of which particular events may be explained and predicted and 
thus scientifically understood; for to understand a phenomenon 
scientifically is to show that it occurs in accordance with 
general laws or theoretical principles. (1965/1994, p. 317) 
 
In turn, biomedical psychiatry may be seen as claiming that mental disorders are brain 
diseases and, therefore, psychiatric conditions (such as schizophrenia) and neurological 
conditions (such as multiple sclerosis) should be dealt with in the same way. The acceptance 
that both are natural kinds, in turn, gives rise to the idea that there are natural kinds of people, 
such as the autistic, the schizophrenic, or the clinically depressed. However, in emulating the 
natural sciences and taking human kinds to be natural kinds, biomedical psychiatry arguably 
discounts an important aspect in which human classifications differ from ‘natural’ ones. 
 
While Guze and other proponents of the biomedical model are willing to accept the existence 
of social forces in the production of mental disorders, they adhere to the view that the brain is 
‘at the hub of psychiatric thinking’ (1992, p. 59). This seems to imply a metaphysical 
hierarchy in which the organic element has priority over everything else. In so devising such 
a hierarchy, and in sticking with a natural kind approach to mental disorder, biomedical 
psychiatry seems at first sight utterly irreconcilable with psychosocial views of disorder. At 
the opposite side of the spectrum, Peter Sedgwick argues not that mental disorder, but that 
disease as whole, is a social construction. 
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All departments of nature below the level of mankind are exempt from 
both disease and human classifications of disease and treatment—until 
man intervenes with his own human classifications of disease and 
treatment. The blight that strikes at corn or at potatoes is a human 
invention, for if man wished to cultivate parasites (rather than potatoes 
or corn) there would be no ‘blight’, but simply the necessary 
foddering of the parasite crop. Animals do not have diseases either, 
prior to the presence of man in a meaningful relation with them ... 
Outside the significances that man voluntarily attaches to certain 
conditions, there are no illnesses or diseases in nature ... The fracture 
of the septuagenarian’s femur has, within the world of nature, no more 
significance than the snapping of an autumn leaf from its twig: and the 
invasion of a human organism by cholera-germs carries with it no 
more the stamp of ‘illness’ than does the souring of milk by other 
bacteria. (1973, pp. 30–31, my emphasis) 
 
The moral advanced by Sedgwick is that to be ill is a description or signification we 
collectively attach to certain conditions and that, as such, it invariably involves value 
judgments. ‘Disorder’, ‘illness’ and ‘disease’ are, in this view, concepts like ‘pest’, ‘weed’ or 
‘vermin’. They are open-ended and sensitive to human interests, so whether something counts 
as a disorder or a pest may change as human interests change, and this allows the class to 
grow or diminish over time (Zachar, 2000). The social process of working out such categories 
does not make scientific investigation of a species of pest into a normative endeavor 
(Murphy, 2006, pp. 98–99). Therefore, ‘disorder’ is strikingly dissimilar to natural kind 
terms. 
 
As Hacking notes, one of the defects of the social construction talk exemplified by Sedgwick 
is that it suggests a one-way street. Rather than subscribing to either the natural kinds or the 
social construction programs, however, when confronted with a mental disorder we want to 
be able to say that there are at least some real, mind-independent, biological identifiable 
pathologies and, moreover, that, as a human kind, the labels we attach to those disorders 
interact with its conscious subjects. We don’t think of mental disorder as a one-way, but as a 
two-way street, or rather, ‘a labyrinth of interlocking alleys’ (Hacking 1999, p. 116). 
 
Human Kinds 
Since the publication of his essay ‘Making Up People’ in 1986, Ian Hacking has been 
alluding to the ‘old and powerful idea that we acquire knowledge of humanity by replacing 
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human kinds by physiological or mechanical or neuroelectrical or biomechanical ones’ (1995, 
p. 353). He contends, however, that human kinds, unlike natural kinds, exhibit complex 
interactive relations—between reality, classifications, and things classified—which 
ultimately frustrate such attempts at replacement. 
 
‘Interactive’ is a new concept that applies not to people but 
classifications … that can influence what is classified. … We are 
especially concerned with classifications that, when known by people 
or those around them, and put to work in institutions, change the ways 
in which individuals experience themselves—and may even lead 
people to evolve their feelings and behavior in part because they are 
so classified. (1999, pp. 103–104) 
 
This classificatory feedback results in what Hacking has called the looping effect. Human 
classifications change people because people can become aware that they are so classified, 
and people change classifications because people can adapt or adopt ways of living so as to 
fit or get away from the very classification that may be applied to them. Because human 
subjects are not stationary, but moving targets of classification, what was known about 
people of a kind may become false because people of that kind have changed in virtue of 
what they believe about themselves (Hacking, 1999, p. 34). However, Hacking’s argument 
that human kinds are not natural kinds is based not on the fact that this feedback occurs, but 
that it occurs in a particular way: looping effects are specific to human science classifications 
because it requires the reaction of conscious subjects. Much of his discussion has been 
developed in the context of psychiatry. In Rewriting the Soul, he pursued his chief example: 
the invention and development of the category of multiple personality disorder: 
 
We tend to behave in ways that are expected of us, especially by 
authority figures—doctors, for example. Some physicians had 
[individuals with multiple personalities] among their patients in the 
1840s, but their picture of the disorder was very different from the one 
that is common in the 1990s. The doctors’ vision was different 
because … the doctors’ expectations were different. … People 
classified in a certain way tend to conform to or grow into the ways 
that they are described; but they also evolve in their own ways, so that 
the classifications and descriptions have to be constantly revised. 
Multiple personality is an almost too perfect illustration of this 
feedback effect. (1995b, p. 21) 
 
In response to the objection that a large subset of people to which his theory references are 
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not fully aware of how they are classified, Hacking (1999, p. 115) points out that looping 
effects are pervasive: interaction is not limited to the effects on the expectations and behavior 
of those classified—such as classifying a subject as suffering from mild cognitive 
impairment, and informing them of the diagnosis—but it also includes effects on the 
expectations and behavior of those with whom classified individuals interact. One dramatic 
instance of the effects of psychiatric classifications on people other than those classified was 
prevalent during the predominance of psychoanalysis in American psychiatry: in the 1960s, 
the term refrigerator mother was coined by Bruno Bettelheim (1967), who advanced a 
theory, drawing from Leo Kanner (1943), that singled out lack of maternal warmth during 
child development as a cause of autism and schizophrenia. 
 
Hacking’s notion of interactive kinds is used in contrast with that of indifferent kinds—his 
name for the equivalent ‘natural kinds’, a term he resists to avoid the many different senses of 
this term in the history of philosophy (Hacking, 1991). ‘Indifferent’ has the advantage of 
capturing the distinguishing feature of natural kinds he wants to emphasize, namely, that the 
subjects of these classifications do not interact with them, but are indifferent to how they are 
classified: ‘The classification ‘quark’ is indifferent in the sense that calling a quark a quark 
makes no difference to the quark’ (1999, p. 105). 
 
In Hacking’s terms, then, while ‘plutonium’ would be an example of an indifferent kind, 
‘Zulu’ would be an example of an interactive kind. There is hardly any space for discussing 
the fact that the former is natural and the latter artificial. The particular subset of human 
classifications with which we are engaged, however, seems to blur the boundaries between 
natural and artificial. What kind of kind would mental disorders be in Hacking’s conceptual 
framework? Hacking’s attempt at a reconciliation of the biological and the social dimensions 
in the explanation of psychiatric classifications results in the composite notion of interactive 
and indifferent kinds. His semantic resolution to our question sets the agenda for the 
remainder of the present investigation. 
 
Interactive and Indifferent Kinds 
How can a kind be both interactive and indifferent, constructed and yet natural? To 
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understand Hacking’s plan of action for bridging the gap between organic dysfunction and 
social causation, its use of the work of Saul Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) must be 
grasped. Kripke-Putnam semantics envisages the meaning of a term as a vector, a finite 
sequence of descriptive elements, not unlike a dictionary entry. Rachel Cooper (2005, p. 65) 
notes that these vectors are made up of [1] syntactic markers, [2] semantic markers, [3] a 
stereotype, and [4] the extension. First there is [1] a part of speech and [2] a general category 
of the object signified by the word. Together, Cooper observes, the syntactic and semantic 
markers tell us what kind of a word the word is. For example, ‘water’ is a [1] mass noun and 
[2] natural kind term. Then there is [3] a set of typical descriptions of the term, standard 
examples of its use, and common associations, all of which are subject to change as opinions 
about the kind vary across time. Thus, the stereotype is that which any competent speaker 
must know in order to be said to understand the word. For example, in the case of ‘water’, 
that it is [3] tasteless, colorless, odorless, used for washing, present in oceans, etc. Finally, 
there is [4] the class of things to which the term applies, the actual referent of the word, if it 
indeed has any reference. In the case of ‘water’ the extension is [4] every single sample of 
H2O. 
 
Hacking suggests that we understand the meaning of ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘autism’ as Kripke-
Putnam vectors. The extension of such psychiatric kinds is the neuropathology that underlies 
them, such as overactivity in dopamine systems in the case of schizophrenia (if the dopamine 
hypothesis is correct). The stereotype, however, must include ‘the current idea of autism—
prototypes, theories, hypotheses, therapies, attitudes, the lot’ (1999, 121). This is how social 
construction finds its way into his account. Hacking claims that, in this way, an author of a 
hypothetical paper titled ‘The Social Construction of Childhood Autism’ could maintain that: 
 
(a) there is probably a definite unknown neuropathology P that is the 
cause of the prototypical and most other examples of what we now 
call childhood autism; (b) the idea of childhood autism is a social 
construct that interacts not only with therapists and psychiatrists in 
their treatments, but also interacts with autistic children themselves, 
who find the current mode of being autistic a way for themselves to 
be. (1999, p. 121) 
 
 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 18 (2014): 27-47 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
37 
  José Eduardo Porcher 
 
Thus, Hacking believes that the question of whether mental disorders are real or constructed 
is made dispensable, and that it should be replaced by the technical question ‘How to develop 
a plausible semantics for natural kind terms?’ If he is right, then the product of his resolution, 
the notion of interactive and indifferent kinds, would give us means to successfully be able to 
talk about interactive kinds that ‛pick out genuine causal properties, biological kinds, which, 
like all indifferent kinds, are unaffected, as kinds, by what we know about them’ (1999, p. 
123). 
 
Since the publication of The Social Construction of What?, however, Hacking’s theory has 
been the subject of a number of objections. In what follows, I will present two of them, which 
point to conceptual difficulties and question the strength of his arguments, respectively. As 
Hacking’s recent writings indirectly respond to objections, I will also assess how Hacking’s 
recent retractions converge with further criticism concerning the adequacy of his semantic 
approach to, finally, examine suggestions of how his core insights may be adapted into a 
productive framework for psychiatric thought. 
 
Criticisms of Hacking’s Account 
Jonathan Tsou (2007) recently voiced the question of whether Hacking is entitled to maintain 
that a classification such as ‘autism’ can be both interactive and indifferent. An answer to this 
question turns on how Hacking presents the interactive-indifferent distinction, which, as we 
have seen, he does by positing that [1] interactive kinds have looping effects, while 
indifferent kinds do not (1999, pp. 103–8). Yet we have also seen Hacking contend that [2] 
there are some human kinds that are both indifferent kinds and interactive kinds (1999, pp. 
115–120). Tsou notes that Hacking cannot, without contradicting himself, propose to bring 
together interaction and indifference, since, in Hacking’s own terms, looping exhaustively 
distinguishes them. Thus, if Hacking’s ‘interactive and indifferent kinds’ exist at all, he is 
wrong in that looping cannot be the basis of the interactive-indifferent distinction. The moral 
derived by Tsou is that ‘interactive and indifferent kinds cannot be articulated with reference 
to Hacking’s distinction between interactive kinds and indifferent kinds’ (2007, p. 334). 
 
According to Tsou, the main problem in Hacking’s theory of human kinds is that it suffers 
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from an equivocation of the term ‘indifferent’, visible in the above propositions 1 and 2. 
Whereas in proposition 1 Hacking defines indifference in terms of a lack of looping effects 
(‘calling a quark a quark makes no difference to the quark’), in proposition 2 the meaning of 
indifference refers to an identifiable biological pathology (‘pathology P’). Hacking thus 
unjustifiably conflates the lack of looping effects with the existence of identifiable biological 
regularities for certain psychiatric conditions. 
 
Such conflation betrays a still deeper confusion. Citing Hacking’s claim that ‘many believe 
that specific types of retardation have clear biological causes, to the extent that we can say 
these disorders simply are biological’ (Hacking 1999, p. 116), Tsou notes that Hacking’s 
discussion seems to heedlessly move between two wholly different levels, confusing 
properties of classifications with properties of kinds of things in nature. Hacking indeed 
begins with the discussion of human kind terms—classifications—which are or are not 
subject to social pressures and hence looping. His subsequent account of interactive and 
indifferent kinds, however, abandons the concern with classifications and takes on kinds in 
nature. This is not to say, however, that we should forgo Hacking’s insight that a biological 
pathology associated with schizophrenia or autism is not affected simply by the fact that we 
have found out about it. What it means, Tsou argues, is that Hacking’s resolution rests on an 
inconsistency, namely, that while the distinction in proposition 1 concerns a feature of 
classifications, proposition 2 concerns a feature of objects of classification. 
 
Further criticism of Hacking’s theory has come from the allegation that his arguments do not 
establish a real divide between human kinds and natural kinds (Ereshefsky, 2004). For 
example, Cooper (2004, p. 74) claims that Hacking is not authorized to draw the conclusion 
that that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds from the fact that feedback results in 
human kinds such as ‘autistic’ have histories unlike those of natural kinds such as ‘gold’. She 
points out that feedback would only be incompatible with human kinds being natural kinds if 
we adopted an essentialist view of natural kinds, that is, if we considered all members of a 
natural kind to share some essential property (Wilkerson, 1995). She invokes non-essentialist 
accounts to illustrate the absence of a necessary incompatibility between cultural and 
conceptual feedback on one side, and the natural kind status of human kinds on the other.  
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One of the most prominent such accounts is due to John Dupré (1981), whose pluralism, 
which he formerly labelled promiscuous realism, emerged in his paper ‘Natural Kinds and 
Biological Taxa’ as a response to the impossibility of accommodating biological species in an 
essentialist account. He notes that there are reasons for thinking that often no one genetic 
property or set of properties will be shared by all members of a species (1981, pp. 84‒5), 
especially as gene variation is beneficial as it enable species to adapt to environmental 
changes. Claiming that there is no reason why the account of species currently offered in 
classificatory systematics should preclude their being modestly natural kinds, Dupré invites 
us to imagine a ‘quality space’ in the form of a multidimensional Cartesian coordinate 
system. In it, coordinates would be multiplied to as many as there are qualitative dimensions 
by which living things can be described or picked out. If it were possible to map individual 
organisms on such a space, Dupré suggests, we would find numerous clusters or bumps. ‘In 
some parts of biology these clusters will be almost entirely discrete’ (2002, pp. 33‒4). 
Clusters on the multidimensional quality space would correspond to similar groupings, and 
some of these would probably correspond to essentialist natural kinds, while others would be 
the product of our attention being placed on a particular dimension of the map. In this way, 
Dupré presents an account that is both realist, in that the clusters reflect the real structure of 
the world, and non-essentialist, in that there will be several incommensurable modes of 
classification depending on the clusters to which we attend. 
 
Cooper argues that it is really in reference to non-essentialist views that we should ask 
whether human kinds are fundamentally like or unlike mind-independent, natural kinds. Are 
Dupré’s kinds incompatible with the feedback which, according to Hacking, distinguishes 
natural kinds from human kinds by way of their indifference? We have seen that Hacking’s 
claim rests on the fact that the people we classify (and those people with whom they interact) 
are aware of how they are being classified (at least to some degree). While this certainly 
establishes a significant difference between natural and human kinds, Cooper maintains that 
‘the fact that only human kinds are affected by the subject’s ideas will only be a reason for 
thinking that human kinds are distinct from natural kinds if an extra premise is added, to the 
effect that being affected by the ideas is of greater metaphysical significance than being 
affected by, say, antibiotics’ (2004, p. 79). 
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No indication is given in Hacking’s writings to the effect that he would be willing to endorse 
such a premise. In fact, a telling afore-cited passage hints at the contrary, stating that some 
human kinds ‘pick out genuine causal properties, biological kinds, which, like all indifferent 
kinds, are unaffected, as kinds, by what we know about them’ (1999, p. 123). It is noteworthy 
that Hacking here contrasts the looping effect with ‘genuine causal properties,’ as if only 
biology can be genuinely productive of behavior. As Dominic Murphy (2001, p. 153) points 
out, that begs the very question it raises, namely, the relation of social construction to 
biological psychiatry. 
 
Since Cooper’s paper, however, Hacking has revised his stance on both natural and human 
kinds. After passing in review of, and finding flaw in, almost every theory of natural kinds in 
the history of philosophy since the first uses of the term by William Whewell and John Stuart 
Mill, Hacking (2007, p. 238) finally concludes that although we may judge some 
classifications as more natural than others, there is neither a precise nor even a vague class of 
classifications that may usefully be called the class of natural kinds. Thus, this is how he 
responds to Cooper’s objection: 
 
A simple deduction: there is no such thing as a natural kind, a fortiori, 
there is no such thing as a human kind. Rachel Cooper in my opinion 
did not get to the root of the evil in her astute paper, ‘Why Hacking is 
Wrong about Human Kinds’ ... She opposes what she calls my ‘central 
claim that human kinds and natural kinds are fundamentally distinct.’ 
In fact, there do not exist two classes (of the sort indicated) that can be 
defined sufficiently clearly to be either distinct or not distinct. (2007b, 
p. 291, fn. 17). 
 
Needless to say, this does not mean the end of all our exploring. As Hacking himself declared 
after his statement of the ‘semantic resolution’ in The Social Construction of What?, ‘the 
dynamics of classification is where the action is’ (1999, p. 124). Since they are chiefly 
methodological, the problems in approaching the issue from a semantic standpoint should by 
no means hinder us from delving into the pragmatic dimension of human classifications, let 
alone distract us from the pursuit of a successful reconciliation. 
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Murphy’s Emendation of Hacking’s Account 
As we have seen, Hacking’s ‘semantic resolution’ states that the referent of a human 
classification such as ‘autism’ is the pathology that causes that condition, and that the 
stereotype associated with the classification will be subject to feedback and, hence, will have 
looping effects. With Tsou, however, we have seen that ‘indifferent kind’ does not refer to a 
classification without looping effects, but to the causes of a kind of thing in nature (for our 
purposes, pathology P). Hacking’s approach thus fails insofar as it does not show how that 
psychiatric classifications are indifferent kinds in the sense of being classifications without 
looping effects. 
 
Still, what can be made by way of a positive reaction to Hacking’s core insights, which, 
despite the failure of their translation into a semantic model, strike us as being fundamentally 
correct? Murphy’s emendation of Hacking’s reconciliation provides a way, if not an answer. 
Murphy claims that we are never going to be able to separate out the social and the biological 
to deal with them individually in the way Hacking seems to have envisaged and that, 
therefore, we should instead add a cognitive dimension to the biomedical model to 
productively bring together biology and society in the explanation of mental disorders. 
 
A holistic, albeit medical, model of variation in psychiatric disorder would concede that in 
some cases symptoms are very malleable to modification-by-expectation. This is best 
exemplified by the existence of so-called culture-bound syndromes (Rebhun, 2004). Some of 
the examples we find in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) are running amok (Malaysia and 
Indonesia), brain fag (West Africa), and mal de ojo (Hispanic populations). Hacking 
proposed an explanation of similar phenomena in Mad Travellers, the chief example of which 
was dissociative fugue, a trance-like state characterized by reversible amnesia accompanied 
by intensive wandering. It was predominantly diagnosed in France in the late 19th century 
but disappeared by the early 20th century. Analogously to the combination of elements which 
form an ecosystem, Hacking suggested that various medical, institutional, demographic and 
cultural vectors serve to facilitate the surfacing of a niche, that is, a particular way of going 
mad. Hacking’s idea is that a disorder, in order to become observable, must provide ‘some 
release for its sufferers that is not available elsewhere in the culture in which it thrives’ 
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(1998, p. 2). 
 
The sudden spreading of anorexia in Hong Kong (Lee, 1991) and clinical depression in Japan 
(Watters, 2010) following their increasing Westernization suggests that those staples of 
psychiatric diagnostics may well be some of our culture-bound syndromes, which have been 
‘exported’ eastward. A measure of social constructionism might at this point seem healthy. 
Still, not only social, but more inflexible organic dimensions of disorders might plausibly 
present variation from one culture to another. What is more, it might present variation from 
one person to another. In this vein, Murphy points to the importance of considering 
phenomenological vectors in devising a model of psychopathological variation: 
 
Under different conditions the same neuropathology might result in 
different symptoms. Behavior depends not just on brain states but also 
on the interaction of social, biological, and psychological systems so 
that similar pathologies may have different prognoses depending on a 
complicated array of factors. There is good evidence, for instance, that 
whether or not intense emotional distress becomes pathological 
anxiety depends not on the nature of the emotional reaction itself but 
on one’s network of support and beliefs about how anxiety should be 
dealt with [e.g. McHugh and Slavney (1998)]. (2001, p. 154)  
 
This may sound obvious to a practicing psychotherapist. And it sounds familiar to cognitive 
scientists in virtue of the established fact of neuroplasticity, the changing and reorganization 
of neurons, their networks and their function through new experiences—an idea first hinted at 
by William James in chapter IV of The Principles of Psychology. Neuroplasticity is not only 
a good model for the explanation of interpersonal variation, but also illuminates the fact that 
the form of one brain pathology may vary according to the social forces at play, resulting in 
different manifestations, as exemplified by culture-bound syndromes. Murphy (2001, p. 154) 
notes that the brain, as the organ of cognition, changes in response to changes in the social 
and cultural environment and, thus, concludes that in order that we may understand how 
behavior might be socially constructed, we need to understand the neuropsychological 
structures that mediate between society and behavior. 
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Conclusion 
The looping effects of human classifications and the social construction of pathological 
niches occur in virtue of humans having the capacity to form conscious mental 
representations, which are responsible for the production of behavioral manifestations. The 
way people think has an impact contiguous with organic dysfunctions—not metaphysically 
inferior to what may be viewed as ‘genuine’ causal properties. This is why the biomedical 
model should not be abandoned, but amended. We can understand how the social can be 
mediated by the biological through the study of how our brains form social representation. 
And we can understand how different experience of psychological afflictions can arise from 
similar biology through the study of individual developmental pathways with regard to a 
variety of inputs (Oyama, 2000). Thus Murphy’s view, as Guze’s, rightly eschews the 
common distinction between psychiatry and clinical neuropsychology. But it does so while 
taking into account the possibility that intrinsic impairment in cognitive architecture might be 
detectable even in the absence of clear anatomical evidence. Thus, accommodating a theory 
of psychiatric explanation within the field of cognitive neuroscience with attention to the 
dynamics of classifications seems like our best shot at finally reconciling biology and society 
and honoring Hacking’s insights. 
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